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opinion regarding the preferred nature of the public good;
and (3) problems of adverse selection. Public goods that
entail relatively high fixed costs and have widespread ben-
efits, such as maintaining peace and security through law
enforcement and the military, or maintaining clean air
and water and a stable climate through environmental
protection, should optimally be provided at a centralized
level (Figure 2). Where preferences over the size, quality,
or nature of the public good vary widely, however, more
decentralized provision may be preferable. This is particu-
larly true for goods that have more limited geographic
benefits, and thus a higher degree of rivalry, such as pub-
lic education and community social activities. Wallace
Oates (1972) argues further that policies designed to
achieve distributional equity goals are also best provided
at a federal level to avoid the adverse budgetary effects that
might arise with poorer families selecting to live in, and
richer families selecting to live outside of, those state and
local jurisdictions with more progressive policies.
It is worth noting that not all publicly provided goods
are pure public goods by the conventional definition
employed in this entry. Information, for instance, is non-
rival in consumption but certainly potentially excludable.
Legal rights and the rule of law are potentially excludable
as well, as history has demonstrated to many disenfran-
chised communities. Common property resources like
fish, on the other hand, are nonexcludable, but their con-
sumption is rival. In each case government regulation of
the provision process—whether through patent law, civil
rights legislation, or fishery management—can in princi-
ple be desirable. In weak and failed states, however, regu-
lation of resources may generate incentives for corruption,
as officials “sell” licenses and grant access for personal
profit. In other cases, governments have opted to provide
private goods, such as education, health care, or postal
services, all of which are both rival and excludable, in
order to capitalize on fixed costs, achieve beneficial exter-
nalities, or to adopt certain standards (the benefits of
which are both nonrival and nonexcludable).
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PUBLIC HEALTH
Public health is a branch of the social and health sciences,
as well as a field of social and health endeavor, that aims
at collective action for the prevention of disease and the
promotion of health. The U.S. Institute of Medicine
offers this definition: “public health is what we, as a soci-
ety, do collectively to assure the conditions in which peo-
ple can be healthy” (K. Gebbie, L. Rosenstock, and L. M.
Hernandez 2003). Depending on the political philosophy
of governance and the role of the state, this aim and its
operational applications have taken different shapes in dif-
ferent contexts. In some contexts, “public health” refers to
public-sector health; in other contexts, the term refers to
the public’s health.
Public health is as old as history itself. Most holy texts
(including the Bible, Torah, and Qur’an) contain instruc-
tions regulating sanitary behavior. Other belief systems,
such as the Indian Ayurveda (from the Sanskrit ayu—life
and veda—knowledge of ), have formulated prescriptions
for leading healthy lives. The Hippocratic writings have
been highly influential in Western conceptualizations of
health and illness. Although the ancient Greek physician
Hippocrates (c. 460–377 BCE) and his school are found to
be the fathers (and mothers) of modern medicine, their
instructions for healthy housing are the direct forebears of
current perspectives on environmental health.
The rise of modern public health occurred in the
mid-nineteenth century. With the advance of statistics
and empirically-based science, health advocates (later
known as the hygienists) in France, Germany, England,
and the United States endeavored to link disease patterns
to environmental conditions. These hygienists had roots
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Figure 2: Optimal Centralization of Public Good Provision
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in engineering, law, and charity, and to a lesser extent in
emerging scientific—allopathic—medicine. British royal
anesthesiologist John Snow (1813–1858) made a break-
through in 1854. Using an ancestor of what is known as a
geographic information system, Snow was able to attrib-
ute cholera outbreaks in Victorian London to the quality
of water coming from the city’s Broad Street pump.
Although public health science had certainly made its
mark with the work of early epidemiologists, public health
action was relatively slow to follow, mostly because the
proposed interventions met with considerable political
resistance. The idea that large infrastructural works
(sewage systems, garbage collection, piped water) had to
be put in place for the public good was persistently coun-
tered with arguments that the delivery of appropriate indi-
vidual health care services, and emphasis on the
responsibilities of individuals for their lifestyles, would
yield better results. Ultimately, though, the political argu-
ment that the workforce was withering as a result of lack
of public action won over the critics.
Formal public health training in this tradition started
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1889 and
at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
in 1899. A pressing debate emerged in the United States
around the question of whether public health was a
branch of medicine and should thus be taught in medical
schools. The Flexner Report (1910), sponsored by the
Carnegie Foundation, found that schools of public health
should be separate entities. In Europe, however, there was
a commonly shared belief that public health was an inte-
gral part of the medical realm. Outside the United States,
the Rockefeller Foundation eventually sponsored schools
of public health that were closely allied with medicine (in
Zagreb, Beijing, and London). Public health in Europe
became known as social medicine or (in the United
Kingdom) as public health medicine.
The breakthrough stature that the field had acquired
in the second half of the nineteenth century withered,
regrettably, as a consequence of advances in vaccine devel-
opment and immunology. The dominant idea became
that most, if not all, disease could be treated or prevented
through immunological interventions. Public health
could contribute to this notion by developing population-
based vaccination campaigns. The social and political
aspects of public health science and action lost promi-
nence, even in those realms where the political dimensions
of health issues were blatantly obvious. Governments had
been engaging, since a failed first meeting in Paris in
1851, in a series of “sanitary conferences” aimed at regu-
lating the transmission of disease between nation-states
through measures such as quarantine. Such efforts would
clearly have had an impact on trade, which was why most
of these conferences had limited success.
In the era of globalization, little has changed in the
public health landscape. Trade and mobility are profound
drivers of the potentially rapid spread of infectious dis-
eases such as avian influenza or SARS (severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome)—the 2003 SARS outbreak in China led
to a World Health Organization (WHO) travel warning
for Toronto—and tensions between individual foci on the
promotion of health and community-based orientations
have not been resolved.
One would, for instance, expect that modern public
health knowledge and practices would have been able to
prevent the Black Death (or “pestilence”) that ravaged
Europe in the mid-fourteenth century. At the time, witch-
craft, ethnicity (arguments reminiscent of those voiced in
the twentieth century on the HIV/AIDS epidemic by
some religious groups), and seasonal bad airs were blamed
for the pandemic. Current scientific knowledge of the dis-
ease pathogen and its vectors would, supposedly, account
for more effective interventions, reducing overall mortality.
This supposition is only partly true. Bubonic plague is still
endemic in many nations. Similarly, the global community
has not been able to fully contain or control contemporary
cholera pandemics, nor will it be able to fully prevent
annual influenza outbreaks, including those caused by par-
ticularly virulent pathogens such as the H1N5 avian
influenza virus. It must be recognized that pathogens are
an inseparable element of the global ecosystem, and global
public health surveillance and control systems—partly due
to political indolence, sometimes referred to as a “betrayal
of trust”—have only a limited capacity to proactively
engage in their complete prevention.
Many international organizations include health in
their considerations: for example, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) deals with workplace health,
UNICEF with maternal and child health, the UN-
Habitat with urban health, and UNESCO with education
for health in schools. The United Nations technical
agency responsible for health matters since its inception in
1948 (its establishment urged by Brazil and China at the
UN founding conference in San Francisco in 1945) is 
the WHO.
The WHO is the only UN technical agency that,
apart from a global headquarters and national liaison
offices, has six Regional Offices (in Europe, the eastern
Mediterranean, Africa, Southeast Asia, the Western
Pacific, and the Americas). These offices formulate
“regional” policies following directions from the global
World Health Assembly. The programs of the WHO in its
first decades focused on infectious disease. The greatest
accomplishment of this era is the first and only eradica-
tion of a major human disease, smallpox (1967–1977).
This accomplishment also signaled, however, the end of
the infectious disease paradigm. From the launch of the
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“primary health care” approach following an international
meeting in Alma Ata (Almaty), Kazakhstan, in 1978, the
community and social aspects of health promotion and
the management and delivery of care became more impor-
tant than biomedical intervention considerations. In this
shift, the WHO has experienced great successes and fail-
ures. Under the visionary leadership of Halfdan Mahler
(1973–1988), the WHO positioned itself as a powerful
broker for health between professionals, governments, and
communities. The WHO’s next director-general, Hiroshi
Nakajima (1988–1998), was accused of letting the orga-
nization fall victim to corruption, a pawn of (pharmaceu-
tical) industries, with an ineffective bureaucracy not
responsive to such global threats as HIV/AIDS nor the
call for evidence-based medicine and public health. His
successor, Gro Harlem Brundtland (1998–2003), was
elected to take charge and reposition the organization.
One of her most visible accomplishments was the com-
missioning of a series of studies into macroeconomics and
health chaired by the American economist Jeffrey Sachs.
Lee Jong-Wook (1945–2006), who became WHO direc-
tor-general in 2003, further advanced the social science
angle of the organization by appointing in 2005 a presti-
gious Commission on Social Determinants of Health.
This commission is to report on early child development,
health systems, employment, globalization, urban set-
tings, and gender in public health, among other issues.
This range of topics again emphasizes the intrinsically
political nature of public health.
In the 1990s, the WHO established a list of essential
functions to which public health agencies should strive to
conform:
• Prevention, surveillance, and control of
communicable and noncommunicable diseases
• Monitoring of health situations
• Health promotion
• Occupational health
• Protection of the environment
• Public health legislation and regulations
• Public health management
• Specific public health services
• Personal health care for vulnerable and high-risk
populations
The list reflects the ideal that public health must
embrace insights from the social and natural sciences.
These would range, for instance, from molecular medi-
cine to empowerment and community development, tox-
icology, and political science. Some disciplines, such as
epidemiology and health services research, are uniquely
aligned to the public health realm. Others have specialized
branches related to public health, notably biostatistics,
health economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology,
and environmental health. In many universities, schools
of public health provide a critical link between faculties.
However, the domain is also rich in contention, particu-
larly where the survival or growth of “established” disci-
plines is concerned. A pivotal review by the U.S. Institute
of Medicine, for instance, demonstrated the enormous
untapped potential for insights from the social and behav-
ioral sciences in the promotion of health. These insights,
for reasons linked to “disciplinary exclusiveness,” have not
yet pervaded “traditional” public health research and
teaching.
Another level of rivalry has developed around the
application of public health expertise. On a scale, two
extremes are found. One, predominantly carried by labo-
ratory-based public health sciences, poses that clinical
expertise determines courses of action. This would, for
instance, relate to the legitimacy to implement popula-
tion-wide vaccination or risk-behavior-change campaigns
(top-down). Others, notably the radical social sciences,
start from the position that health is an inherently social
condition and that community-driven action is most
appropriate (bottom-up). Agreement is difficult to reach,
and a “mixed-scanning” approach is often advocated by
the WHO and many local public health agencies.
An organization strongly committed to the bottom-
up approach is the global People’s Health Assembly
(PHA), an alliance of academics, communities, and non-
governmental organizations. The PHA endeavors to 
balance the expert-driven globalized stance with a com-
munity-based local (“glocal”) approach. A major imbal-
ance with which both the PHA and the WHO struggle is
the “ninety/ten divide”: 90 percent of the global public
health research effort is spent on only 10 percent of the
global health burden. Important players in this arena,
apart from the WHO, are private sector entities. These
include pharmaceutical industries and charitable organi-
zations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
(the largest single donor to public health efforts—over $5
billion—in 2005).
The nexus between globalization and health is an
important research challenge. Like the unresolved
ninety/ten divide, most public health research resources
are devoted to issues in industrialized nations. These
include such matters as access to and the efficiency of
health services—for example, medical technology assess-
ment and health services financing schemes (often mirror-
ing, again, the difference between public sector or the
public’s health). A critical issue in these analyses is the
inequitable distribution of access, as well as disease bur-
den, within and not between nations. Research into
equity and inequalities in health top many European
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agendas; in other countries, such terms have been deemed
politically taboo, which has not prevented research into
areas that are alternatively labeled with less value-laden
terms, such as social exclusion or diversity and health.
Ethnicity, socioeconomic status, heredity, and gender
issues thus remain at the core of many public health con-
troversies.
SEE ALSO Disease; Health Economics; National Health
Insurance; World Health Organization
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PUBLIC INTEREST
While there is no one public interest, most political
philosophers credit some notion of collective welfare.
Examples include French philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s “general will,” U.S. president James Madison’s
“collective good,” or English philosopher Jeremy
Bentham’s “greatest good for the greatest number.” In
debate, public interest is often invoked when a faction’s
influence harms the larger group. As James Madison
defined it in Federalist Paper number 10, the tenth
Federalist Paper in a series of published articles arguing for
the ratification of the U.S. Constitution:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or a minor-
ity…united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.
There are two core conceptions of the public interest,
organic/republican and utilitarian/liberal. In Western phi-
losophy, “republican” societies regard the state or society
as a collective entity, possessing virtues and commanding
citizen obligations that dominate individual or self-inter-
ested objectives. “Liberal” conceptions of public interest
focus on individual welfare or value, and invoke some
assumption justifying interpersonal comparisons of value
or satisfaction.
Political theorists couple normative conceptions of
public interest with claims about institutional design. One
extreme is the Rousseau-Marx approach (named after
Rousseau and German political philosopher Karl Marx),
which suggests an objective underlying definition of the
good or virtuous society. According to this approach, any
action or policy that violates this objective “public inter-
est” is a mistake, or even a crime against citizens.
Near the other extreme are conceptions of the public
interest that credit consensus, appealing not to objective
values but to deliberation. In varying degrees this view is
embodied in the writings of John Rawls, Jürgen
Habermas, and James Fishkin. This approach claims that
reasonable people can achieve consensus (or near consen-
sus) on public policy problems through deliberation.
But some would go further. “Agonistic pluralists,”
such as Chantal Mouffe, require only that citizens disagree
peacefully. Policy debates, in this view, are value-laden and
emotional, so requiring consensus causes violence. The
democratic process is the alternative to violence, an arena
in which fundamental differences can be aired and dis-
cussed, preventing difference from hardening into enmity
and violence. In this regard, it is participation and demo-
cratic engagement, in and of itself, that is the public 
interest.
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
Another approach, rational choice theory, is consequen-
tialist and utilitarian. The public interest can only be
defined, in this tradition, in terms of the Pareto criterion.
The Pareto principle is essentially unanimity: Given a sta-
tus quo policy A, new policy B serves the public interest
if, but only if, all members of the society prefer B to A. A
weaker comparison would allow that many citizens are
indifferent between A and B, but at least one prefers B to
A, and none prefer A to B.
Other proponents might extend valid public interest
arguments to include the work of welfare economists John
Hicks and Nicholas Kaldor. Their “compensation,” or
“potential Pareto” principle, defines the public interest in
terms of monetized gains and losses. If some citizens pre-
fer new policy B to status quo A, but others prefer A to B,
then the Pareto criterion does not apply. But the policy
authority can still discover the public interest, adding up
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